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Abstract
Th e Spanish public pension system has periodically been reformed over the past three decades. 
Th ese reforms have been of varying intensity and diff erent in nature as regards their approval 
process. Th e fi rst major reforms occurred in Spain in the 1980s and were characterised by their 
unilaterality due to the parliamentary majority of the government. Th ey triggered a strong social 
response and various general strikes were called against their measures. 
However, these reforms became more participatory by the mid-1990s. Th e main instrument 
of participation in pension reforms in the Spanish system is known as the Toledo Pact (Pacto de 
Toledo), which has been in force since 1995. It is a parliamentary commission that approves a series 
of declarative principles and recommendations to follow in the reform processes. Its purpose is to 
ensure broad political consensus before passing new regulations. Within this framework, another 
instrument used is social dialogue among government, unions and business organisations. Accord-
ingly, there have been four agreements (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) approving a series of reform 
measures founded on the principles formulated in the Pact. On the basis of these agreements, the 
government in each case presented a bill to the Parliament for discussion and approval.
Th e last reform, which took place in 2013, was very signifi cant due to a huge regression in 
terms of protection levels. Unlike prior reforms, it was passed without social dialogue and without 
following the consensus procedures of the Toledo Pact, thereby implying a return to unilaterality 
in this fi eld.
Th e purpose of this paper is to analyse the functioning and consequences of these instruments 
of participation, focusing on explaining the Toledo Pact, how it works and how it has served to 
increase legitimacy and consensus in pension reforms as opposed to unilateral regulatory changes.
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Spanish society is concerned about and sensitive to its public social security system.2 
Th ere is social awareness of its importance as a social protection mechanism based 
on intergenerational solidarity that plays a decisive role in redistributing wealth to 
achieve equality. Consequently, although this fi eld is a competence of the Parliament, 
political parties decided to exclude it from electoral debate and agreed on an instrument 
of participation aimed at increasing political and social consensus in designing and 
implementing its future reforms. 
Th is ‘consensual method of reforms’3 was set up in 1995 and is known as the Toledo 
Pact (Pacto de Toledo). It is in fact a permanent commission of the Parliament that 
aims to ensure a greater level of consensus in this fi eld before any regulatory changes 
are introduced. As will be seen later, a distinguishing feature of this instrument is its 
combination of political and socio-economic agreements. Consequently, the role of 
social actors has been very important. Social agreements reached by the government 
and most representative trade unions and employers’ associations have been the basis 
for most of the major legal reforms undertaken over the past forty years, developing 
recommendations made within the framework of the Toledo Pact. 
However, two unilateral reforms have also been carried out during this period, one 
before and another aft er the Toledo Pact. Th ey share several common features, such as 
a negative economic context and the existence of a government with a parliamentary 
majority. Th eir main diff erences are the existence of this socio-political agreement, 
which was breached by the government, and the austerity policies and implementation 
of recommendations (and pressures) received from international actors. In this sense, 
the EU exercised a signifi cant infl uence on domestic reform and the participation of 
social actors was ignored.
2  Th e Spanish Constitution recognises the right to social security in Article 41, addressing a man-
date for public authorities to maintain a public social security system to guarantee adequate social assis-
tance and benefi ts in situations of hardship for all citizens. On the principles of the constitutional mod-
el of social security, see M.R. Alarcón Caracuel, La Seguridad Social en España, Pamplona 1999, passim.
It includes two levels of protection: a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, based on defi ned benefi ts, 
and a non-contributory or universal pension scheme. More information on the main features of the 
Spanish pension system can be consulted at OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2017. How does Spain compare?, 
2017, 1–2, www.oecd.org/spain/PAG2017-ESP. For a deeper analysis of the basis and principles of the 
non-contributory schemes, see J. Fargas Fernàndez, Análisis crítico del sistema español de pensiones no 
contributivas, Pamplona 2002.
It also declares the possibility of supplemental protection and benefi ts that are optional in nature, 
although this mechanism plays a fairly insignifi cant role (according to OECD, pension funds represented 
9.5% of the GDP in 2017).
3  J.L. Tortuero Plaza, O. del Aguila Cazorla, E. Martín Jiménez, F. Moreno Romero, La reforma de 
la jubilacion: Políticas de pensiones y políticas de empleo, Premios FIPROS – Fondo para el Fomento de la 
Investigación de la Protección Social 2010, http://www.seg-social.es/prdi00/groups/public/documents/
binario/143941.pdf (accessed: 1.10.2018).
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Th is paper attempts to off er a diachronic analysis of pension reform and participation 
in Spain, focusing mainly on explaining the Toledo Pact, how it works and how it has 
increased legitimacy and consensus in pension reforms as opposed to those exceptional 
cases in which unilateral regulatory changes were made.
Unilateral reforms in the 1980s 
Act 26/1985, of 31 July, on urgent measures to rationalise the structure and protective 
action of Social Security, was the fi rst major reform aft er the restoration of democracy. 
It was adopted unilaterally by the fi rst socialist government of Felipe González, which 
took advantage of its parliamentary majority.
Th e main purpose of the reform was to reduce expenditure in pensions, which may be 
viewed as a structural aim over the past four decades in many countries with developed 
PAYG public pension systems. During the period 1980–1985, the number of pensioners 
increased by one million people (from 4.4 to 5.4 million) and expenditure increased from 
5.77% to 7.52% of GDP. Two of these diff erent changes can be highlighted. Th e reform 
tightened conditions to pension entitlement, with the qualifying period for a retirement 
pension increasing from 10 to 15 years. In addition, the calculation formula of the benefi t 
was also modifi ed, resulting in a fi nal amount that was usually lower. Before the reform, 
the amount was the result of the average of contributions made over the two previous 
years before retirement, but the calculation period increased to eight years aft er this Act.
Th is regulation was highly controversial and generated strong social contestation. 
Th e Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) called for a general 
strike on 20 June 1985. Although the General Workers’ Confederation (UGT), the other 
most representative national trade union, did not participate,4 the strike was supported 
by other unions such as USO, CNT, ELA-STV and INTG. Over the following decade, 
until the beginning of the participatory stage, social confrontation was evident in the 
call for three more general strikes against the Socialists (1988, 1992 and 1994).
The Toledo Pact as a type of State Agreement: guidelines to 
reforming the social security system
According to G. Rodríguez Cabrero5 , social tensions ‘convinced the socialist government’ 
of the need for political parties to negotiate a pact, which is the reason why pension 
4  Th e traditional tight bonds between left -wing political parties and trade unions should be noted, 
which were gradually broken in the following years. In that time, the links between the Socialist Party 
(PSOE) and the trade union UGT were still quite strong, although this reform and other decisions caused 
the rupture. 
5  G. Rodríguez Cabrero, Th e reform of the public pension system in Spain, Institute of Public Goods 
and Policies (CSIC-IPP) Working Papers No. 02–13a, 2002, http://ipp.csic.es/sites/default/fi les/content/
workpaper/2002/dt-0213a.pdf (accessed: 1.10.2018).
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reforms became more participatory by the mid-1990s. Th e main instrument used, as 
already mentioned, is colloquially known as the Toledo Pact, aft er the city in which it 
was formally signed. It is in fact a parliamentary commission that analyses the situation 
of the social security system and approves a series of declarative principles and recom-
mendations guiding future reform processes. Its purpose is to ensure broad political 
consensus before passing new regulations.
Its origins can be found within a Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Aff airs 
in which a working group to analyse Social Security was set up by a non-legislative 
motion that was initiated by the Catalan parliamentary group Convergència i Unió. 
Th is working group adopted a text entitled ‘Analysis of the structural problems of the 
social security system and the main reforms that must be undertaken’. It included fi ft een 
recommendations in this fi eld and was passed by the Committee on Budgetary Aff airs 
on 30 March 1995, to be later ratifi ed in a plenary session by the Parliament.
Th e guidelines for future reforms decided upon in the document were:
1. Separating and clarifying funding sources in order to fi nance contributory 
pensions only through social contributions and non-contributory and universal 
contributions only through general taxes.
2. Constitution of reserves: creation of a fund with surpluses of positive economic 
cycles to deal with negative cycles.
3. Improving contribution bases to match them with real wages and creating a single 
contribution ceiling.
4. Financing special schemes based on the principle of similar contribution for 
similar protection.
5. Improving collection mechanisms to reduce late payments and the black economy.
6. Simplifying and integrating special schemes, gradually reducing these through 
integration into the general scheme or the special scheme for self-employed 
persons.
7. Integrating social security management by improving and incorporating diff erent 
areas, such as membership, collection and benefi ts.
8. Evolution of contributions, reducing these to boost employment, provided that this 
is allowed by the fi nancial equilibrium of the system, and prioritising low-skilled 
workers.
9. Equity and contributivity of the system, in the sense of achieving greater propor-
tionality between benefi ts and the previously undertaken contributory eff orts.
10. Introducing a fl exible, gradual, progressive system in terms of retirement age, 
including incentives to remain active beyond the statutory retirement age (65) 
by reducing or eliminating contributions for these workers.
11. Maintaining the purchasing power of pensions by automatically revaluing them 
according to changes in the consumer price index.
12. Strengthening the principle of solidarity when possible, for instance improving the 
amount of widows’ pensions or increasing the period in which orphans’ benefi ts 
can be enjoyed.
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13. Improving management, specifi cally in relation to monitoring sickness and 
invalidity benefi ts to reduce possible fraud, among other measures.
14. Enhancing complementary social protection by improving fi scal stimulus measures.
15. Analysing and monitoring the evolution of the system every fi ve years by creating 
a working group to examine the present and future of the system. 
According to this last recommendation, ‘(…) (c)urrent forecasts can be signifi cantly 
altered in the coming decades. It is therefore of the greatest interest that instruments are 
used, in the Government and in the Parliament, to monitor and periodically evaluate the 
evolution of the magnitudes that intervene in the fi nancial equilibrium of the system to 
operate with the interventions that were required in any eventuality. Th is information 
will be transferred to social partners (…)’. Th is has two diff erent consequences: on the 
one hand, the possible renewal of the guidelines aft er monitoring; on the other hand, 
the reference to social partners has been used to include them in the transformation 
process of these recommendations into specifi c legal contents, as previously noted. 
In application of the last recommendation on the periodic evaluation of the system, it 
was renewed through Resolution 2 October 2003 with the addition of fi ve new guidelines:
1. New working methods: paying special attention to part-time and temporary work 
and the possibility of making benefi ts and salaries compatible should be analysed.
2. Women and social protection: along the lines of advancing in policies reconciling 
family and professional life and eliminating the gender wage gap.
3. Dependency: it is considered that a system to address this problem should be 
created.6
4. Disability: the impact of public policies on this group should be analysed.
5. Immigration: establishing measures to guarantee the incorporation of migrants 
into the labour market and social protection system.
Th e working group approved a report on the Evaluation and Reform of the Toledo 
Pact on 29 December 2010 and this was later passed by a plenary parliamentary session 
on 25 January 2011. One of its main measures concerned increasing the statutory 
retirement age. Th e main idea was to increase the eff ective retirement age to guarantee 
the future viability of the pension system, considering the increase in life expectancy, 
reduction of working-age population and increase in pensioners. To this end, it was 
pointed out that ‘any change in the legal age of retirement must be progressive without 
aff ecting those who are going to retire in the immediate future and should not be carried 
out in a homogeneous and forced manner for all people’. It is important to emphasise 
the dissenting opinion unanimously passed by all parliamentary groups on the role of 
the working group in charge of monitoring and evaluating the social security system: 
it ‘defends the maintenance and improvement of the public pension system, based on 
a PAYG scheme and solidarity’.
6  Some years later, a new social protection system was created by Act 39/2006, of 14 December, on 
the promotion of personal autonomy and care of dependent persons.
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Aft er the most recent authoritarian, unilateral period in which a controversial 
regulation was passed, as will be seen later, the working group is currently holding 
various meetings.7 Indeed, among the diff erent issues subject to discussion, the new 
revaluation index that was unilaterally introduced by the former government in 2013 
can be highlighted, in line with agreeing to a system that maintains the purchasing 
power of pensioners.
The Toledo Pact as a model of par  cipa  on in pension reform
Th ree major phases can be identifi ed when it comes to general procedure. First, the 
working group includes the participation of all parliamentary groups. An important 
basis of its activity is a series of public hearings in which various individuals appear to 
give their opinions and these people are viewed as working group deputies. Th ey include 
representatives of trade unions, employers’ associations, public institutions, specialists 
and anyone who believes they can contribute useful elements in the debate to reach 
some conclusions. Second, aft er the recommendations are approved in the Parliament, 
a participatory process involving social partners commences. During this, the government 
and social partners agree on specifi c measures based on the guidelines. Aft er this, in the 
fi nal stage, the government draft s a bill based on this agreement, following the usual 
procedure in the Parliament and Senate. Th e executive branch guides the entire process 
and legislative power defi nes the guidelines and the specifi c contents of the regulation 
both at the beginning and end.
As mentioned earlier, there is a reference to social partners in the fi rst set of guide-
lines off ered by the Toledo Pact. Legislative power has considered the constitutional 
provision that recognises the important position of employers’ associations and trade 
unions (Article 7)8 in the political, social and economic arena –within the ‘social and 
7  Discussions that took place within the working group are analysed in the chronicles of D. Gutiérrez 
Colominas, Comisión de seguimiento y evaluación de los acuerdos Pacto de Toledo (Sesión 25), Nueva 
Revista Española de Derecho Del Trabajo 2018, 209, p. 295–316; F.J. Hierro Hierro, Comisión de segui-
miento y evaluación de los Acuerdos Pacto de Toledo (Sesiones 1 a 5), Nueva Revista Española de Derecho 
Del Trabajo 2017, 195, p. 305–316; F.J. Hierro Hierro, Comisión de seguimiento y evaluación de los Acuerdos 
Pacto de Toledo (Sesiones 11 a 15), Nueva Revista Española de Derecho Del Trabajo 2017, 198, p. 375–
386; F.J. Hierro Hierro, Comisión de seguimiento y evaluación de los Acuerdos Pacto de Toledo (Sesiones 
16 a 20), Nueva Revista Española de Derecho Del Trabajo 2017, 199, p. 307–327; F.J. Hierro Hierro, 
Comisión de seguimiento y evaluación de los Acuerdos Pacto de Toledo (Sesiones 21 a 24), Nueva Revista 
Española de Derecho Del Trabajo 2017, 202, p. 313–326; F.J. Hierro Hierro, Comisión de seguimiento y 
evaluación de los Acuerdos Pacto de Toledo (Sesiones 6 a 10), Nueva Revista Española de Derecho Del 
Trabajo 2017, 196, p. 269–281..
8  ‘Article 7. Trade unions and employers’ associations contribute to the defence and promotion of 
the economic and social interests which they represent. Th eir creation and the exercise of their activi-
ties shall be unrestricted in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Th eir internal structure 
and operation must be democratic.’
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democratic State, subject to the rule of law’, under Article 1– alongside that of political 
parties (Article 6).9 According to the Constitutional Court, this recognition means that 
‘trade unions are a basic component or an essential institution of the Spanish constitutional 
system’ (Constitutional Court ruling 101/1996). Aft er a 40-year period of dictatorship, 
Spain’s Constitution defi nes a democratic model of industrial relations, assuming 
a principle of political and social pluralism. An expression of this, in the fi eld of social 
security, can be found in Article 129.1 of this Constitution, which states that ‘(t)he law 
shall establish the forms of participation in Social Security and in the activities of those 
public bodies whose operation directly aff ects the quality of life or the general welfare’.
An overview of agreed reforms 
Within this framework, social dialogue among the government, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations establishes specifi c measures that consider these recommendations. Th ere 
have been four agreements (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) approving a series of reform 
measures founded on the principles formulated in the Toledo Pact.10 On the basis of 
these agreements, the government presented a bill to Parliament for discussion and 
approval (see the Table in the Appendix, in which an overview of various renewals of 
the Toledo Pact, Social Agreement and subsequent Acts can be seen).
Th ere were two reforms following the process explained earlier aft er the fi rst set of 
recommendations by the Parliament within the framework of the Toledo Pact. Th e fi rst 
began in 1996 with an Agreement on consolidating and rationalising the social security 
system, signed on 9 October. It was subscribed by the Popular Party (PP) government 
and the trade unions CCOO and UGT. Th is fi rst agreement was reached within a context 
of economic crisis and was not signed by the employers’ associations.
Despite strong pressure in favour of a public system of capitalisation, an important 
basic agreement was the idea of reinforcing the PAYG system and the principle of inter-
generational solidarity upon which it is based. Its contents contained various measures 
to improve protection, such as an increase in widowers’ pensions. On the other hand, 
the calculation period of the retirement pension increased from eight to fi ft een years. 
It was a very similar measure to the one unilaterally adopted in 1985; however, it was 
not controversial at that time. According to Tortuero Plaza et al., it is indicative of the 
9  ‘Article 6. Political parties are the expression of political pluralism; they contribute to the formation 
and expression of the will of the people and are a fundamental instrument for political participation. 
Th eir creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and 
the law. Th eir internal structure and operation must be democratic.’
10  For a more detailed, descriptive analysis of the contents of the original Toledo Pact and its sub-
sequent versions, Social Agreements and later norms implementing them, see J.A Panizo Robles, Dos 
décadas de reformas de la Seguridad Social: Del Pacto de Toledo de 1995 al Acuerdo Social y Económico de 
2011, Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 2011.
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eff ectiveness of the agreed method of the Toledo Pact because it off ers legitimacy and 
enables it to be accepted
Th en, Act 24/1997, of 15 July, on the consolidation and rationalisation of the social 
security system. Th is introduced changes in determining retirement pension amounts 
in order to allow greater proportionality between the years of contributions and the 
percentage to be applied in the calculation basis. Th e requirements to access early 
retirement were modifi ed, reserved only to those that were mutualist on 1 January 1967, 
when the current social security system began, establishing coeffi  cients that reduced the 
amount considering the time remaining for the ordinary age and the time contributing 
to the system. Incentives to extend working life were also introduced.
A new social agreement was reached only fi ve years later: the Agreement to improve 
and develop the social protection system was signed on 9 April 2001. It was subscribed 
by the government of the Popular Party, the trade union CCOO (the other most 
representative trade union, UGT, did not ultimately sign the agreement, although it 
participated throughout the entire bargaining process) and the two major national 
employers’ associations: CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales) 
and CEPIME (Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa), signing it 
for the fi rst time. 
Th e economic context and fi nancial situation of the system was more positive, 
thereby motivating the creation of a reserve fund by taking advantage of system surp-
luses, as suggested in the Pact’s recommendation. Within this context, the separation 
of funding sources occurs, a measure that later became controversial when periods
of high unemployment placed the fi nancial viability of the system under strain. On the 
other hand, the permanence of the active worker was voluntarily encouraged through 
incentives and bonuses.
Th en, Act 35/2002, of 12 July, on establishing measures for a gradual, fl exible retirement 
system, was passed. Th e introduction of this new fl exible retirement mechanism allowed 
several possibilities: early retirement before the ordinary age, with high contribution 
periods and a reduction in the benefi t amount; deferred retirement aft er 65, including 
various measures to incentivise this, and partial retirement, viewed as an employment 
mechanism to rejuvenate companies’ workforces.
A new social agreement in 2006 followed the renewal of the Toledo Pact in 2003. Th is 
Agreement on social security measures signed on 2 June has a peculiarity that is worth 
underlining. It is the fi rst time that all the actors ideally involved in the bargaining process 
signed if for the fi rst time: the government (in this case, the Socialist Party, PSOE), most 
representative national trade unions (CCOO and UGT) and employers’ organisations 
(CEOE and CEPIME). Th e economy was experiencing a period of growth and so the 
renewal of the Pact, as noted earlier, included new phenomena to consider, such as 
women and migrants or dependency. However, the agreement insisted on reinforcing 
contributions to guarantee the fi nancial equilibrium of the system.
As a consequence, Act 40/2007, of 4 December, on measures within the fi eld of social 
security, was passed. One of its most important features was that the theoretical days 
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of contribution were not considered when computing the qualifying period of 15 years 
to obtain a retirement pension. Th us, 15 real years of contribution (5,475 days) were 
required instead of the 12.86 real years needed until that moment.11 Reduction coeffi  cients 
in early retirement and bonus coeffi  cients in deferred retirement were improved and 
requirements for access to partial retirement were also reformed. 
Th e last agreed reform was in 2011, which was approved almost simultaneously with 
the Toledo Pact working group report. Aft er the Social and economic agreement for 
growth, employment and pension guarantee signed on 2 February 2011, Act 27/2011, 
of 1 August, on the adaptation and modernisation of the Social Security system, was 
passed. Th e most important changes it introduced were aimed at making the system 
fi nancially sustainable: the statutory retirement age was increased from 65 to 67, the 
period of contribution to obtain a full pension was increased from 35 to 37 years and the 
calculation period was also increased from the last 15 years of salary to the last 25 years.12
The latest unilateral (and regressive) reforms: The impact
of economic purposes and interna  onal organisa  ons
Th e latest reforms were very signifi cant not only from the point of view of content, 
due to the huge regression of levels of protection they caused, but also from a formal 
perspective, as it meant a return to unilaterality in this fi eld, without the consensus 
procedures of the Toledo Pact. Th e government led this reform without any prior 
political or social agreement. 
Th is could be viewed as part of a new wave of reforms in which one distinctive 
feature is perhaps the special impact of certain global economic and/or political actors 
in domestic legal systems.13 Act 23/2013, of 23 December, regulating the sustainability 
factor and the revaluation index of social security pensions, was passed within a context 
11  Th ese theoretical days of contribution are in fact a legal fi ction. It refers to the two annual extra 
payments, usually taking place in summer and Christmas. As long as workers receive fourteen monthly 
payments and contribute to the social security system on that basis each year, it is considered that each 
year has theoretically fourteen months to the purposes of fulfi lling the requirement of a qualifying period. 
In consequence, each day is equivalent to 1.16666 theoretical days of contribution (14/12). 
12  Th e problems of age discrimination that this reform, and the following one in 2013, creates have 
been noted, due to an ‘increase of the contributory level for social security, and a decrease in the level of 
protection – especially in the case of women’ (J. López López, C. Chacartegui, Age Discrimination: A vi-
sion from the South, in: A. Numhauser-Henning, M. Ronnmar (eds.), Age Discrimination and Labour 
Law: Comparative and Conceptual Perspectives in the EU and Beyond (pp. 263–278), Alphen aan den Rijn 
(Th e Netherlands) 2015, passim).
13  Although an analysis of pension reform policy from the 1990s shows that the domestic discourse 
in reforms has been aligned with EU institutions since that time, due to the need to comply with re-
quirements no join the European Monetary Union (L.N.Carrera, When does Europe matter? An analysis 
of pension reform policy in Spain and Italy, European Union Studies Association (EUSA) 11th Biennial 
International Conference 2009, p. 1–32, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24602/(accessed: 1.10.2018).
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of harsh austerity measures and a soft  bailout for Spain. Actors such as the OECD, 
World Bank, IMF (through their reports and recommendations) and the EU (through 
its economic governance) had a clear infl uence in the orientation and specifi c content 
of these reforms.14 
According to some scholars, the introduction of the sustainability factor was in fact 
a ‘quiet shift ’ of the public pension system, which thereby became a defi ned contribution 
scheme.15 On the other hand, a new revaluation index was also introduced that took 
into consideration diff erent variables (interannual variation of incomes, contributory 
pensions and system expenditure).
Although there was no strong reaction against this social security reforms in general, 
the specifi c employment reform that was introduced in 2012 led to the calling of two 
general strikes against its measures (on 29 March 2012 and 14 November 2012). However, 
an interesting grassroots movement has emerged against these measures, especially the 
new revaluation index. Th is movement has been led by pensioners who have become 
self-organised in local groups and coordinated regionally and nationally under the 
name of the Pensioner Tide (Marea Pensionista).16 Th ey have combined diff erent actions 
against these measures, such as informative activities about the consequences of the 
reform and demonstrations. But a very interesting question that should be underlined 
is the judicialization they have undertaken. 
In fact, there is a previous normative example of unilaterality in the regulatory changes 
of pensions: Decree-Law No. 28/2012, on measures of consolidation and guarantee 
of the social security system. For the fi rst time, it established the non-revaluation of 
pensions by automatically taking into account the CPI and set a lower percentage. 
Domiciano Sandoval, a pensioner and activist of Marea Pensionista in Barcelona, and 
Miguel Arenas, lawyer at Col·lectiu Ronda, a lawyers’ cooperative, have appealed against 
these measures in Spanish Labour Courts and the European Court of Human Rights, 
which has accepted it for processing.17 Consequently, and also because of other political 
circumstances, a special increase in pensions was recently passed and the revaluation 
index is under discussion within the working group.
14  J.A. Fernández Avilés  focuses on the tensions between economic and social purposes see J.A. 
Fernández Avilés, Nuevas recomendaciones sociolaborales Europeas para la reforma: más tensión entre 
la lógica economicista y las razones sociales, Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 2018, 424, p. 5–12.
15  J. Díaz-Giménez, Las Pensiones Europeas y sus Reformas Recientes, Instituto BBVA de Pensiones 
No. Documento de trabajo 7, 2014; J.L. Monereo, J.A. Fernández Bernat, El factor de sostenibilidad en 
España: ¿Un nuevo paso para el cambio silencioso de modelo de pensiones públicas? Revista de Derecho 
Social 2013, 62, p. 209–238.
16  Information on their activities can be seen at http://mareapensionista.org (last accessed: 20.07.2018).
17 More information can be retrieved from https://www.cronda.coop/es/Actualidad/Noticias/
Admitida-a-tramite (last accessed: 20.07.2018). 
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Some conclusions for discussion
According to Schludi (2005), concertation is a ‘condition for successful implementation 
of pension reforms’, regardless of whether it occurs between the government and other 
political parties, between the government and trade unions or, ultimately, among all these 
actors. Consequently, the Spanish experience seems to be useful in terms of legitimacy 
and acceptance, at least from a formal point of view, regardless of the results of reforms 
that may be more or less satisfactory for citizens. 
However, two points should be noted. First, this mechanism depends on political 
will. Th us, the confl uence of absolute majorities, on the one hand, and economic crises 
and serious fi nancial imbalances in the system, on the other hand, have historically 
led to the unilateral imposition of reforms. Th is was especially concerning in the 2013 
reform, aft er the Toledo Pact, to the extent that global actors seemed to replace national 
democratic instruments of participation, both in a political and socio-economic fi eld. 
And second, although an interesting instrument of participation, using the legal instru-
ments recognising collective rights and giving some competences to most representative 
national trade unions, some imperfections exist to the extent that the positions of other 
trade unions (some of them the most representative in an Autonomous Community) 
and civil society and citizens associations, such as the Pensioners Tide, are not consid-
ered.18 A good example of this is the general strike called on 27 January 2011 by the 
trade unions ELA-STV, LAB, CIG, CGT and CNT in some Autonomous Communities 
(Catalonia, Galicia, Euskadi and Navarra) and the general demonstrations that took 
place in various cities at a national level against the 2011 pension reform. Although the 
Toledo Pact mechanism maximises consensus, it does not guarantee full agreement on 
either the guidelines or measures. Th e extension of the participatory process should be 
considered in order to let other voices contribute to co-construct reforms and a system 
of higher majorities should be implemented to maximize consensus as much as possible.
As Duchemin and Weber (2013) has indicated, the fi nancial crisis led to a lower 
degree of infl uence by social partners on pension reforms; in fact, they stress that social 
partners had more opportunity to bargain in those cases without budget constraints.19 
A very good example can be found in the resurgence of unilateral (and very deep and 
regressive) changes in 2013, under the Popular Party government, which had an absolute 
majority in the Parliament.
18  According to OECD data, trade union membership was 13.9% in Spain, in 2015.
19  Th ey indicate four diff erent cases in their report on recent reforms of statutory PAYG pension 
systems: unilateral reforms (Greece, Portugal, etc.); reforms with prior consultation of social partners, 
but without infl uencing the fi nal result due to strong disagreements in some aspects (Belgium, France, 
Italy); reforms with prior bargaining with trade unions, which obtained several outcomes in the fi nal 
regulations, accepting the increase of the statutory retirement age (Netherlands, Spain); and, fi nally, those 
cases, such as Norway, with a strong social dialogue, where social partners had an important infl uence 
in reforms. Th is report, however, was published before the Spanish reform of 2013, so the classifi cation 
in that group is due to the previous reform of 2011.
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A last, but not least, refl ection has to do with the classical tensions between economic 
interests and the effi  cacy of social rights. Despite this degree of participation, it has been 
noted that the Toledo Pact, and its later implementation, was initially structured upon 
a main principle of a fi nancial nature instead of a prior reason of protection, thereby 
conditioning this protection to fi nancing.20
Appendix
Table 1. Social Security Reforms (1985–2018)
Unilateral reforms
1985 (socialist 
government of Felipe 
González)
Act 26/1985, of 31 July, on urgent measures to 
ra  onalise the structure and protec  ve ac  on of 
social security
2013 (Popular Party 
government of Mariano 
Rajoy)
Act 23/2013, of 23 December, regula  ng the 
sustainability factor and the revalua  on index of 
social security pensions
Agreed reforms
Toledo Pact (1995) Agreement on 
consolida  on and 
ra  onalisa  on of the 
social security system (9 
October 1996)
Act 24/1997, of 15 July, 
on consolida  on and 
ra  onalisa  on of the 
social security system
Agreement for the 
improvement and 
development of social 
protec  on system 
(9 April 2001)
Act 35/2002, of 12 July, 
establishing measures 
for a gradual and fl exible 
re  rement system
Renewal of Toledo Pact 
(2003)
Agreement on social 
security measures 
(2 June 2006)
Act 40/2007, of 4 
December, on measures 
within the fi eld of social 
security 
Follow-up of Toledo Pact 
(2003–2008)
Report of Toledo Pact 
(2011)
Social and economic 
agreement for growth, 
employment and 
pension guarantee (2 
February 2011)
Act 27/2011, 
of 1 August, on the 
adapta  on and 
modernisa  on of the 
social security system
Source: Own work.
20  In this sense, S. González Ortega criticises the separation of funding sources, warning about future 
risks, such as recent problems to pay benefi ts with contributions (see S. González Ortega, La reforma de 
las pensiones públicas a través de la defi nición de sus principios organizativos, Cuadernos de Relaciones 
Laborales 1998, 12, p. 35–53.
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